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JUST OUTCOMES, OVERREACHING RATIONALES:
HOW INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW'S ACHIEVEMENTS AUGUR
FLAWED RESPONSES TO POLITICAL VIOLENCE
Brad R. Roth*
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last two decades, international criminal justice has risen to
extraordinary prominence as a feature of the international legal order.' Beginning
with the United Nations (UN) Security Council's establishment of the
International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 1993 and
for Rwanda (ICTR) in 1994, criminal processes have moved from international
law's periphery to its core, becoming intertwined with the peace and security
regime. Not only have the Security Council's extraordinary Chapter VII powers
been interpreted to include the discretion to subject categories of individuals to
penal jurisdiction without state consent,2 but the commission of international
crimes within states has come to be recognized - under the "Responsibility to
Protect" doctrine - as a sufficient ground for Chapter VII measures up to and
including the use of force. 3 Beyond this, states increasingly have, by treaty and by
participation or acquiescence in collective manifestations of opinio juris,
renounced their sovereign capacities to shield state officials who commit specified
aggravated breaches of human rights and humanitarian law, irrespective of the
location of the conduct or nationality of the victims. Not only have a majority of
states consented to the jurisdiction of an International Criminal Court (ICC), but
many more have left themselves open to cross-border projections of power by
foreign-state courts, now individually "deputized" to exercise universal
jurisdiction.
All of these developments qualify earlier understandings of state
sovereignty, and in many instances transform international law from ally to foe of
sovereign prerogative. Whatever may be still said of state sovereignty within
* Professor of Political Science and Law, Wayne State University, Detroit,
Michigan, U.S.A. J.D., Harvard Law School, 1987; LL.M., Columbia Law School, 1992;
Ph.D., University of California at Berkeley, 1996. A version of this article was presented at
the conference, Justice Beyond the State: Transnationalism and Law, at the University of
Windsor, Ontario, Canada, on September 20-21, 2013.1 For a critical examination of this phenomenon from a perspective different from
what follows below, see Kenneth Anderson, The Rise of International Criminal Law:
Intended and Unintended Consequences, 20 EuR. J. INT'L L. 331 (2009).
2 See Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1-1, Decision on Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2,
1995).
3 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, 139, U.N. Doc. AIRES/60/1
(Oct. 24, 2005); see also S.C. Res. 1674, 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1674 (Apr. 28, 2006)
(reaffirming paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome).
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international law,4 it can no longer be identified directly with official impunity for
the most heinous atrocities: leaders who were once quite literally laws unto
themselves - bearers of the last word on what counted as the legitimate use of
force in their territories - are now palpably subject to extraterritorial penal
consequences, and their states potentially subject to legally authorized military
intervention.
These developments are, in the main, a good thing. But there can be too
much of a good thing.5  The potential problem lies not in the extraterritorial
prosecutions themselves - which so far have entailed relatively little true
overreach - but in the exuberant characterizations of their animating principles,
whether contained in the dicta of court judgments, in the writings of academic
commentators, or in the slogans of human rights activists.
Much of this rhetoric casts international criminal law not as amending,
but as transforming the global juridical order. Slogans such as "an end to
impunity" and "no safe havens" - and their counterpart doctrinal innovations -
tend to elevate these supposed imperatives to the level of categorical priorities, to
which other legal considerations must give way. Consequently, the fulfillment of
these imperatives comes to be posited, not only as the true test of international
legality's efficacy, but as a condition of fidelity to constraints that international
law places on righteous self-help. Sovereignty with responsibility is thus prone to
being supplanted by sovereignty as responsibility-portending a unilateral
withholding of respect for the legal inviolabilities of a foreign state deemed to
have defaulted on its responsibilities.
6
International criminal justice processes, from Nuremberg onward, have
arisen in contexts of extraordinary crime. The International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg - the international criminal justice prototype - was directed against
4 I have given this question book-length treatment. See BRAD R. ROTH, SOVEREIGN
EQUALITY AND MORAL DISAGREEMENT (2011).
5 I have made more elaborate arguments to this effect. See Brad R. Roth, Coming
to Terms with Ruthlessness: Sovereign Equality, Global Pluralism, and the Limits of
International Criminal Justice, 8 SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L. 23 (2010); see also Brad R.
Roth, Just Short of Torture: Abusive Treatment and the Limits of International Criminal
Justice, 6 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 215 (2008).
6 As one official of the George W. Bush Administration put it:
Sovereignty entails obligations. One is not to massacre your own
people. Another is not to support terrorism in any way. If a
government fails to meet these obligations, then it forfeits some of the
normal advantages of sovereignty, including the right to be left alone
inside your own territory. Other governments, including the United
States, gain the right to intervene.
Richard Haass, Director of Policy Planning for the George W. Bush State Department,
quoted in Nicholas Lemann, The Next World Order, THE NEW YORKER (Apr. 1, 2002),
http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2002/04/01/020401 faFACT1.
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the most outrageous state behavior in recorded history.7 The ICTY and the ICTR
responded to campaigns of "ethnic cleansing" and genocide that were understood
broadly to be antithetical to the purposes underlying such state prerogatives as the
international order acknowledges and protects. 8 Universal jurisdiction, beginning
with the Eichmann case, 9 has proved expedient in thwarting escapes by
acknowledged perpetrators of notorious atrocities. 10
Extraordinary circumstances justify extraordinary responses - including
relaxation of certain rules that, if applied rigidly to extraordinary circumstances,
would frustrate the purposes and principles that compose the substructure of the
rules themselves. Even "the principle of legality" itself- nullum crimen sine lege
- rings hollow in the face of mass extermination. But therein lies a temptation to
make a virtue of necessity and to allow the exception to swallow the rule.
Innovations designed for exceptional cases are celebrated in ways that augur
expansion rather than limitation of their applicability. Expectations become
skewed, and the frustration of those expectations leads either to cynicism or to the
embrace of unbridled self-help.
Restraints on unilateral pursuits of justice are a feature, not a flaw, of the
international legal order. International law's most essential function is to establish
a framework for cooperation among bearers, not only of conflicting material
interests, but also of conflicting moral dispositions." 1 Universal judgments about
justice are often elusive, and those actors capable of unilaterally implementing
even genuine universal principles are often both untrusted and untrustworthy.
Indeed, a presumptive "impunity," far from being the antithesis of international
legality, is implicit in any international order that does not (as did the Nuremberg
moment) presuppose victor and vanquished. International law is tasked with
providing the foundation of peace among global actors who may regard one
another as criminals.
This article seeks to counteract a series of misimpressions associated
with exuberance about international criminal justice. These misimpressions
7 See Judicial Decisions Involving Questions of International Law - International
Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 172 (1947)
[hereinafter IMT Judgment].
8 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 827, 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993); see also S.C.
Res. 955, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
9 Attorney-General of the Government of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5 (1961),
aff'd, 36 1.L.R. 277 (Supreme Ct. of Israel 1962).
10 Strikingly illustrative is the Belgian prosecution of Rwandan nuns who, before
taking up residence in Belgium, had assisted in the murder of Tutsi civilians during the
1994 genocide. Henry J. Steiner, Three Cheers for Universal Jurisdiction - Or Is It Only
Two?, 5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 199, 214 (2004) (citing Public Prosecutor v. the
"Butare Four," Cour d'Assises [Cour. ass.] [Court of Assizes] Brussels, June 8, 2001).
11 See ROBERT JACKSON, THE GLOBAL COVENANT: HUMAN CONDUCT IN A WORLD OF
STATES 368 (2000) ("[P]erhaps the most fundamental [concern of modem international
society] has been . . . to confine religious and ideological weltanschauungen within the
territorial cages of national borders .... ") (alteration in original). See generally TERRY
NARDIN, LAW, MORALITY, AND THE RELATIONS OF STATES (1983).
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concern: (a) the nature of the political violence that ordinarily occasions serious
human rights and humanitarian law violations; (b) the juridical relationship of
human rights norms to other norms of international law; and (c) international
law's uses and limitations in addressing political violence within states. The goal,
in correcting these misimpressions, is not to disparage the accomplishments of
international criminal justice processes, but instead to appreciate them as
accomplishments in their own right, rather than as a down payment on a larger
project of justice beyond borders.
II. THE NATURE OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE
International crimes are a product of political conflict, whether within or
across national boundaries. Sometimes the criminal conduct is an end in itself: a
systematic campaign to destroy or displace a discrete civilian population, or the
opportunistic indulgence of sadism, venality, or private vendetta behind the
smokescreen of the prevalent chaos and violence.12 But much of the transgression
is undertaken as a means to a cognizable political end, one that often garners
substantial loyalty-including among informed persons of good faith and sound
reason. 13
Whereas criminal tribunals apply generally applicable standards to
discrete acts, to the exclusion of broader considerations, historical judgments
apply more holistic criteria. Ruthlessness in a noble cause, far from being
universally reprehended, is often well appreciated or even celebrated. (U.S.
President Harry S. Truman has been widely admired for his moral courage, not
despite his decisions to obliterate Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but because of them.)
The maxim that "the end can never justify the means," however persuasive in a
courtroom or in a philosophy seminar room, does not reflect broadly shared
attitudes where morally imperative ends are perceived to be at stake. 4
12 See, e.g., STATHIS N. KALYVAS, THE LOGIC OF VIOLENCE IN CIVIL WAR (2006);
Stathis N. Kalyvas, "New" and "Old" Civil Wars: A Valid Distinction?, 54 WORLD POL.
99 (2001).
13 That this was the case on the Allied side of World War II is well known, if not
often highlighted. See, e.g., Hans Blix, Area Bombardment: Rules and Reasons, 49 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 31, 37 (1978) (quoting Telford Taylor: "Aerial bombardment had been used
so extensively and ruthlessly on the Allied as well as the Axis side that neither at
Nuremberg nor Tokyo was the issue made a part of the trials"). Even today, support for
torture (in the interrogation of certain high-value terrorist suspects) is not unknown among
highly placed and deeply thoughtful members of the legal academy. See Eric A. Posner &
Adrian Vermeule, Should Coercive Interrogation Be Legal?, 104 MICH. L. REV. 671
(2006).
14 A survey by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, conducted in
the United States in October 2005, asked 2,006 adults whether they thought "the use of
torture against suspected terrorists in order to gain important information can often be
justified, sometimes be justified, rarely be justified, or never be justified." Sixty-three
percent responded that, at least on rare occasions, torture for that purpose could be justified.
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The renewal of the long-dormant project of international criminal justice
coincided with technological developments that permitted the major liberal war-
fighting powers (i.e., the United States and its most prominent Western allies) to
avoid reliance on the crude methods of the recent past. 15 It also coincided with the
end of Cold War, which obviated a previously felt need for liberal-democratic
governments to supply extensive weaponry, training, and logistical support to
local forces around the globe - often participants in "hot" civil wars - who were
considered to be doing the great powers' "dirty work."
16
Even if a genuine moral advance - spurred by the international human
rights movement - can be said to have occurred in that moment, the timing
rendered the advance conveniently inexpensive; there was, by then, little call
among liberal internationalist elites for recourse to the ruthlessness of prior eras. 
17
Tom Carney, Americans, Especially Catholics, Approve of Torture, NAT'L CATH. REP.
(Mar. 24, 2006), http://www.natcath.org/NCROnline/archives2/2006a/032406/0324
06h.htm.
15 The Allied Powers in World War II firebombed cities in Germany and Japan,
producing hundreds of thousands of civilian casualties even before the fateful decision to
drop nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. A similar pattern marked the conduct of
the Korean War (a fact that seems to have been largely forgotten everywhere, but in North
Korea). See BRUCE CUMINGs, THE ORIGINS OF THE KOREAN WAR 753 (1990) (attributing
hundreds of thousands of North Korean civilian deaths to U.S. strategic bombing). As
recently as the Vietnam War, attacks from the air, at times notoriously, took the form of
"carpet-bombing." These tactics could hardly be distinguished from terrorism, except for
the fact that they were undertaken by the regular armed forces of recognized states; their
goals were not only to cripple the enemy war effort's productive infrastructure, but also "to
bring home the cost" of the enemy government's policies to that government's civilian
constituents. See, e.g., Marilyn Young, Bombing Civilians: From the Twentieth to the
Twenty-First Centuries, in BOMBING CIVILIANS: A TWENTIET-CENTURY HISTORY 154, 164
(Yuki Tanaka & Marilyn B. Young eds., 2009).
16 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS, THE TRIAL OF HENRY KISSINGER (2002);
RAYMOND BONNER, WEAKNESS AND DECEIT: U.S. POLICY AND EL SALVADOR (1984).
17 The usefulness of violence remains a touchstone of its permissibility. Whereas
blatantly indiscriminate attacks are now condemned, criminal liability for collateral
infliction of civilian losses is limited to cases in which such losses figure to be "clearly
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated ...."
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8, § (2)(b)(iv), July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute]. This is hardly a
peripheral matter since the number of civilians killed as a direct result of United States and
Allied operations in Iraq is estimated at ten thousand to fifteen thousand. See, e.g.,
Madelyn Hsiao-Rei Hicks et al., Violent Deaths of Iraqi Civilians, 2003-2008: Analysis by
Perpetrator, Weapon, Time, and Location, PLOS MEDICINE (Feb. 15, 2011),
http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info:doi/0. 1371/journal.pmed. 1000415.
Moreover, many gruesome, but useful military tactics remain not prohibited.
Such tactics may include, shockingly, the use of white phosphorus in combat against enemy
troops. See US Forces Used "Chemical Weapon" in Iraq, THE INDEP. (Nov. 16, 2005),
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-forces-used-chemical-weapon-in-
iraq-515551.html; Scott Shane, Defense of Phosphorus Use Turns Into Damage Control,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21 2005, at Al. Furthermore, Article 35(2) of Protocol I Additional to
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Moreover, that historical moment, far from being marked by soul-searching about
past misdeeds and recrimination toward previous revered figures, was suffused
with moralistic Western triumphalism about victory over the Communist "evil
empire."'18 Over two decades later, no significant effort has been made to revise
favorable historical judgments of Western officials who perpetrated or abetted
ruthless policies - let alone to impose penal accountability - even though some
no-longer-useful erstwhile clients (e.g., Augusto Pinochet, Hiss~ne Habrd) have
been subjected to transnational justice processes. 19
The point here is not to make accusations of hypocrisy, but simply to
notice that support for ruthless forms of political violence is not as foreign to the
liberal-democratic sensibility as the currently prevalent rhetoric would seem to
suggest. However often serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law
may correctly be ascribed to fanaticism or to cynical calculations of self-interest,
experience suggests that sober and principled persons can sign on as well where
they perceive the moral stakes of the conflict to be sufficiently high.2 0  For
the Geneva Conventions - to which the United States is not a party, but which the United
States acknowledges as including many provisions that embody customary international
law - prohibits employing "weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare of a
nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering," but this provision arguably
does not preclude use of incendiary chemicals against fortified structures occupied by
combatants. See 1977 Protocol Additional to the General Conventions of 12 August 1949,
and Relating to the Protections of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art.
35(a), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
18 Most of such rhetoric was less audacious than that of Francis Fukuyama's famous
essay, The End of History?, in THE NATIONAL INTEREST (1989). But even the less
optimistic forecasts about the post-Cold War world were hardly introspective. See, e.g.,
Douglas Brinkley, Democratic Enlargement: The Clinton Doctrine, FOREIGN POL'Y, Spring
1997, at 112 ("Although America's bedrock values of democracy and open markets were in
ascendance worldwide - as citizens everywhere busily cast votes, bought stock, and wrote
laws - the collapse of the Soviet empire lifted the lid from a cauldron of ethnic animosities
and regional conflict.").
19 See Regina v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate (Pinochet III), [2000] 1
A.C. 147 (H.L.) [hereinafter Pinochet] (approving the extradition to Spain of former
Chilean leader Augusto Pinochet Ugarte); Questions Relating to the Obligation to
Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. (2012), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/144/17064.pdf (affirming the obligation of Senegal to
try or extradite former Chadian leader Hiss~ne Habr6).
20 As I have argued elsewhere:
Under sufficiently adverse conditions, such as extreme ethno-national
or socioeconomic polarization, the interaction of these two problems -
the inability to agree on a fair basic structure of public order, and the
inability to exclude recourse to extraordinary means in the struggle to
install or maintain a basic structure of public order that comports with
one's own conception of fairness - leads informed persons of good
faith and sound reason to support ruthless measures against one
another. Where the gap between competing conceptions of fairness is
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participants in real-life conflicts, the conflict's outcome has a moral significance
that rivals that of constraints on the conduct of hostilities. 2' Especially where one
has become convinced that the other side respects no limits, it can be morally
plausible to, embrace all measures necessary to neutralize the threat. Such
rationalizations of ruthlessness may be wrong and censurable in any one given
case or in all cases, but adoption of such rationales does not separate an iniquitous
"them" from a righteous "us"; they are a part of the human condition.
Peace with the perpetrators of ruthlessness is often attainable and
desirable. This typically requires an agreement to disagree about who were the
heroes and who were the villains. The 1993 handshake between Yitzhak Rabin
and Yasir Arafat was an iconic moment that peacemakers aspire to renew. Ian
Paisley and Gerry Adams now cooperate in the governance of Northern Ireland,
while in El Salvador, there is cohabitation of the party of the left-wing former
guerrillas (which holds the Presidency) and that of right-wing former death squads
(which dominates the legislature).22 Meanwhile, the clich6 that "yesterday's
terrorist is tomorrow's statesman" finds vindication in the democratic presidencies
of one-time urban guerrillas Dilma Rousseff and Jose Mujica of Brazil and
Uruguay, respectively.
To notice this is not to say that retrospective justice, including retributive
justice, has no place in the transitions from civil war to peace and from
dictatorship to constitutionalism. The often ill-posed "peace versus justice"
question draws the response from hardline foes of immunity and amnesty that
there is no contradiction: that true peace requires a "settling of accounts" in order
to end the "culture of impunity., 2 3 That assertion may be true in any given case.
sufficiently great, and the perceived moral stakes of political conflict
sufficiently high, efforts to forge a mutually acceptable institutional
solution will fail, prompting recourse to an unmediated clash of social
forces. The result is a principled recourse to measures, such as
dictatorship, repression, and terrorism, that would be rejected in the
abstract.
Roth, supra note 4, at 105.
21 For a provocative recent articulation of this point, see Dwight Garner, Son of
Israel, Caught in the Middle, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2013, at Cl (quoting ARI SHAVIT, MY
PROMISED LAND: THE TRIUMPH AND TRAGEDY OF ISRAEL 131 (2013) ("If need be, I'll stand
by the damned. Because I know that if it wasn't for them, the State of Israel would not
have been born. If it wasn't for them, I would not have been born. They did the dirty,
filthy work that enables my people, myself, my daughter and my sons to live.")), available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/20/books/ari-shavits-my-promised-land.html?.
22 See, e.g., After Decades of Hatred, Paisley and Adams Finally Sit Side by Side
and Agree to Share Power, MAIL ONLINE (Mar. 27, 2007),
http://www.dailymaii.co.uk/news/article-444523/After-decades-hatred-Paisley-Adams-
finally-sit-side-agree-share-power.html; Tim Padgett, El Salvador's Left Wins with the
Ballot, Not the Bullet, TIME WORLD (Mar. 16, 2009),
http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1885573,00.html#ixzz2m6M26o8n.
23 See, e.g., Leila Nadya Sadat, Universal Jurisdiction, National Amnesties, & Truth
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But that assertion is not an a priori truth, to be insisted upon across the
diversity of historical circumstances; it is matter for local settlement (as least
presumptively). "No peace without justice" - especially where it refers to
retrospective penal accountability - is a terrible slogan, since the opposing sides,
along with their often-ample respective social bases, disagree about what justice
entails. Outside forces may, in the name of universal human rights, play a
productive role in insisting on processes to establish a credible historical record of
violent acts, to recognize the victims as bearers of rights that were violated, and to
provide reparation to victims and their families. Vilification of perpetrators,
however, is a matter best left to be resolved according to local circumstances
rather than one-size-fits-all standards, except where special international interests
(such as against genocide, ethnic cleansing, and widespread attacks on civilian
populations) are implicated.
Concededly, this separation of the wrong suffered from the wrong
committed contradicts an intuition that animates enthusiasm for international
criminal justice. As the Nuremberg tribunal famously noted, unlawful state acts
are "committed by men, not by abstract entities. 24 It is supposed to be one of the
lessons of the Nazi era (perhaps most famously explored in the Eichmann case)
that impersonal governmental mechanisms (or, for that matter, insurgent
command structures) cannot be allowed to obfuscate personal responsibility for
atrocities.
But one should not extrapolate too far from the extraordinary case. Much
political violence is attributable to structural conditions rather than to willfulness,
a fact that continues to be reflected in law long after Nuremberg.25 The criminal
justice mentality presupposes a baseline of harmony, disturbed by aberrant acts; in
this conception, criminal prosecution "settles accounts," while redressing the
"culture of impunity" by punishing those who "did it because they could. ' '26
Where the baseline is not harmony, but chaos and violent conflict,
conflict participants' responsibilities to one set of human beings, on whose behalf
they see themselves as acting, can seem plausibly to contradict their responsibility
Commissions: Reconciling the Irreconcilable, in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: NATIONAL
COURTS AND THE PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (Stephen
Macedo ed., 2003); Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice
Prevent Future Atrocities?, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 7 (2001); Juan E. Mendez, National
Reconciliation, Transnational Justice, and the International Criminal Court, 15 ETHICS &
INT'L AFF. 25 (2001); Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute
Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537 (1991).
24 IMT Judgment, supra note 7, at 221.
25 Combatant privilege to this day continues to govern soldiers' participation in
their nations' unlawful wars. One theory, proposed prior to Nuremberg by Col. William C.
Chanler, but rejected by the Allied powers, would have held that Wehrmacht soldiers
participating in their state's unlawful offensive uses of force lacked combatant privilege
and could thus be susceptible to prosecution for their combat violence as domestic crime.
See TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS 37 (1992).
26 See, e.g., Sadat, supra note 23; Akhavan, supra note 23; Mendez, supra note 23;
Orentlicher, supra note 23.
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to another set of human beings, upon whom they are acting. In a morally ordered
universe, a wrong suffered logically entails a wrong committed; the real world of
violent conflict, to the contrary, contains contradictions and incommensurables.
Such conflicts are not, as a rule, contested cleanly (especially where "smart"
weaponry is not available or deployable), even if some conflict participants are
markedly worse than others; vulnerability to retributive justice processes is
widespread in principle, albeit highly selective in practice.
The much-maligned 2013 ICTY Perigi6 judgment represents a
concession to the complexities of violent conflict. 27 In ordinary circumstances, it
seems reasonable to ascribe criminal complicity to those who provide assistance
to persons whom they know will use it in the perpetration of crimes. But in the
context of armed conflict, one's allies, whose war efforts one may have a
cognizable duty to assist, may be known to be engaged in a combination of
legitimate and illegitimate war-fighting measures. The policy of assisting such
forces may or may not be reprehensible, depending on a totality of the
circumstances. To render it an international crime, however, is to vilify
sweepingly a wide range of actors who have engaged in such assistance for
morally plausible reasons.2 8 (Moreover, in a system where customary practice is a
touchstone of legal obligation, the "everybody does it" defense is not inherently
invalid.)29 The ICTY Appeals Chamber thus, in a judgment seemingly at odds
with the dicta of past decisions, held that the assistance, to constitute an act of
criminal complicity, must be "specifically directed" to the criminal component of
the perpetrators' activities.
30
Even though it has worked to shield Serbian officials who engaged in
authentically reprehensible conduct, the Perigi judgment represents a welcome
recognition that international crimes, to be credible, must pertain to conduct that
the international community of states has genuinely renounced. This renunciation
has occurred mostly with respect to those measures that do not appear useful to
cognizable governmental ends, and rather entail or suggest, by their very nature,
either rogue activity or ends that the international community has authoritatively
27 Prosecutor v. Perigi6, Case No. IT-04-81-A, Judgment (Feb. 28, 2013). But see
Prosecutor v. Sainovid, Case No. IT-05-87-A, Judgment (Jan. 23, 2014) (contrary holding
by a different Appeals Chamber panel).
28 It has been alleged that United States and Israeli military officials influenced the
Chief Judge to change the ICTY's course in this regard. See Marko Milanovic, Danish
Judge Blasts ICTY President, EJIL:TALK! (Jan. 7, 2014, 4:43 PM), http://www.ejiltalk.org/
danish-judge-blasts-icty-president/.
29 The much-maligned tu quoque defense has considerable force where a standard's
legal validity ultimately rests on its manifestation in patterns of actual practice. Even at
Nuremberg, German Admiral Karl Doenitz was successfully defended on the count of
engaging in unrestricted submarine warfare on the basis of an affidavit from U.S. Admiral
Chester Nimitz, who averred that he had done the same against the Japanese. See Gerry J.
Simpson, Didactic and Dissident Histories in War Crimes Trials, 60 ALBANY L. REv. 801,
806 n.26 (1997); IMTJudgment, supra note 7, at 305.
30 Perii6, Case No. IT-04-81-A, 73 (quoting Tadi6 Appeal Judgement [sic],
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repudiated (such as "ethnic cleansing"). Only the most extreme discrete acts have
been renounced irrespective of context, and where the renounced tactic of torture
has been employed in circumstances that have led some to rationalize its use,
retrospective justice has unsurprisingly given way to a determination to "look
forward, not backward.'
Criminal justice approaches to political violence seek, in effect, to
depoliticize the violence. This can be done only either where the political dispute
is authoritatively settled or where the violence was opportunistic and its political
component essentially pretextual. Genocide and crimes against humanity are not
cognizably political acts because the international system has succeeded in
excluding from sovereign prerogative the pursuit of the ends that these crimes, by
their nature, embody. The great contribution of the ICTY has been to make clear
that what was once understood as a cognizably political objective - "population
transfer" - is so thoroughly bound up with crimes against humanity that it can no
longer be viewed in these terms.
Other forms of violence, however, remain ineluctably political. An
Argentinian commentator, Federico Finchelstein, recently lamented the Kirchner
Administration's political characterizations of the 1970s "dirty war" as follows:
The country has moved beyond Videla's efforts at
"reconciliation"; it is clear from the reactions to his death that in
Argentina almost nobody buys Videla's idea that the military
were saviors of the nation . . . . Equally problematic from a
historical standpoint are the efforts by the Kirchner
administrations to present the victims as heroes.
In effect, this marks a shift from a legal perception of
perpetrators and victims under the junta, to a moral one of a
"war" between heroes and villains. This is exactly how Videla
wanted to be remembered - as a warrior in a violent political
contest.
Such efforts to emphasize the political identities of the victims
as the main reason for their victimization retroactively places
the crimes of the state within the political sphere. Yet these
crimes were outside politics - the "dirty war" was state-
sponsored terrorism, not a struggle between different political
visions.32
31 David Johnson & Charlie Savage, Obama Reluctant to Look Into Bush Programs,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/12/us/politics/12inquire.ht
ml?pagewanted=all.
32 Federico Finchelstein, An Argentinian Dictator's Legacy, N.Y. TIMES (May 28,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/28/opinion/global/an-argentine-dictators-legacy.ht
ml?ref-global&_r-0.
Flawed Responses to Political Violence
This analysis seems highly problematic. First, Finchelstein's account self-
consciously depoliticizes the historical role of the junta, reducing it to an isolated
criminal conspiracy. Apparently, the actions of the junta were not a product of
deep divisions in Argentinian society, undertaken with the tacit support and
collaboration of large sectors of the society that either knew what was being done
or knew that they did not want to know. And therefore, no one, but the members
of the criminal conspiracy was responsible; in Finchelstein's telling, even
members of the regime's ostensible social base were victims of a sort, and any
suggestion of complicity on the part of current members of the conservative elite
is mere calumny. The dictatorship is confined to the past; accounts have now
been settled; the case is closed. Indeed, part of the point of transitional penal
justice is to demonstrate the exceptional nature of political violence and to purge
grudges by exonerating those not identified as part of the criminal conspiracy.
(That is manifestly part of the ideological project of the ICTY.)
Second, Finchelstein's account self-consciously strips all political
identity from those who were killed. They were victims, not martyrs or fallen
participants in a struggle (however flawed) for social transformation; their
inherent humanity is to be respected, perhaps in spite of their politics, but
certainly in isolation from any role as conscious actors. To consider their politics
is to contaminate the apolitical purity of their victimhood, thereby simultaneously
to validate the political agendas of both Videla and Kirchner. (One might
consider that the words "innocent" and "innocuous" are connected.) Yet while
many of those subjected to the regime's ruthlessness were undoubtedly mere
bystanders, many were not-and would, one might imagine, have been appalled
(and perhaps humiliated) to think that they would be remembered in this way.
Underlying Finchelstein's account is a refusal to acknowledge the
political character of the violence for fear that the violence might then be
attributed - at least in part - to the human condition, emerging where the stakes of
political contestation take it beyond the capacity of institutions to contain. To
contextualize criminal acts within political conflict appears to let Videla and his
ilk "off the hook."
It need not. Moral and legal judgments can each be grounded in
something less than a universal, acontextual ascription of criminality to discrete
acts. Nonetheless, the role of the acts' political character in the moral assessment
will depend on the competing moral frameworks used to evaluate conduct (e.g.,
deontological, consequentialist, and virtue-ethics approaches, each in competing
versions). Whether or not there is a universal truth about such matters, there is not
- and there will not be, any time soon - any universal accord about this truth. One
can lament or condemn this lack of accord, but there is no legitimate reason to
pretend that it is not so.
As to legal judgments of a punitive nature, these must be grounded in
social fact rather than in moral truth-not because of any imperative to observe
the precepts of legal positivism, but because nullum crimen sine lege is a natural
law principle that adverts to positive law. Where an authoritative social decision,
applicable to the conduct's time and place, has manifestly (even if not in lex
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scripta) and unambiguously condemned the act in question, the act is legally a
crime, irrespective of extenuating political circumstances. What cannot
legitimately be done is to fill gaps in the law, at the expense of the defendant, on
the basis of "universal" judgments that, however righteous, were not, in fact,
broadly accepted when the conduct occurred. Thus, it is to the dangers of
mistaken legal judgments that we now turn.
III. THE LEGAL LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINALIZATION
International criminal law (ICL) serves to implement a limited part of the
corpus of the international human rights law (IHRL) and international
humanitarian law (IHL). Because the former is therefore closely connected to the
latter, confusion often arises as to the scope of the former and as to methodologies
appropriate to establishing norms of the former.
International legal norms presumptively bind states as corporative
entities; most breaches give rise only to state responsibility. Ordinary
international legal norms may include state obligations to provide internal legal
remedies, including penal remedies, in support of the norms; these international
norms nonetheless remain non-self-executing, becoming applicable to individuals
only insofar as states enact applicable provisions of internal law.
International criminal law differs in piercing the veil of state sovereignty
for specified aggravated breaches of international human rights and humanitarian
law norms; ICL norms thus reach individuals directly, exposing even current and
former state officials to extraterritorial prosecution in either international tribunals
or the domestic courts of foreign states. But whereas IHRL and IHL represent
brakes on the exercise of state power, ICL licenses transboundary exercises of
power against individuals, 33 as well as intrusions upon the domestic jurisdiction of
33 Ironically, the conflation of state and individual responsibility can work against
the implementation of IHL and IHRL norms, given the prevalent reluctance to impugn
respected figures as criminals for their implementation of popularly supported policies.
Illustrative is the effort by the well-known U.S. national security commentator, Benjamin
Wittes, to dismiss IHL scholar, Mary Ellen O'Connell, in these terms:
There you have it. The ACLU's and CCR's expert witness, in response
to the direct question of whether Obama is different from Ted Bundy
and whether Harold Koh is a conspirator to commit murders declines to
use the words "serial killing" or "murder," because they haven't been
convicted yet, but she freely accuses them of being "willing to engage
in unlawful killing." While she declines to call for their prosecution
now, she declines only because she doesn't think it's realistic, and she's
happy, in any event, to "talk about accountability later."
Benjamin Wittes, Is Barack Obama a Serial Killer?, LAWFARE BLOG (Oct. 25, 2010, 3:00
PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2010/10 /is-barack-obama-a-serial-killer/#atpco=smlw
n-1.0& attot=1 &at ab=per-1&at_pos=0.
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states, in ways that derogate from still-effective ordinary norms of international
law.
This fact has two major implications. First, overlapping norms of
jurisdictional limitation, functional immunity (immunity ratione materiae), and
nullum crimen sine lege limit the scope of international criminal liability to what
ICL has specially established. Second, unlike IHRL and IHL norms, which
should be read broadly (against state interests) to effectuate their object and
purpose, ICL norms need to be read narrowly, as carve-outs to otherwise prevalent
norms (limitations on legislative jurisdiction and functional immunity) and in
keeping with the strict-construction corollary to nullum crimen sine lege.
34
Cases involving the prosecution of Nazi perpetrators are sometimes
invoked for contrary propositions. 35 The Nuremberg Tribunal, for example, stated
broadly, "He who violates the laws of war cannot obtain immunity while acting in
pursuance of the authority of the state if the state in authorizing action moves
outside its competence under international law." 36 However, as Michael Akehurst
pointed out, these words were aimed at acts that "were crimes against
international law, so it is doubtful whether they apply to breaches of international
law which are not crimes against international law." 37 Ordinary breaches of
international law, though they incur state responsibility, are not understood to
vitiate functional immunity, and even IHL violations (which peculiarly lend
themselves to criminal prosecution) require some additional element to be
transformed into international crimes.
38
34 "[W]here there is a plausible difference of interpretation or application, the
position which most favors the accused should be adopted." Prosecutor v. Krsti6, Case No.
IT-98-33-T, Judgment, 1 502 (Aug. 2, 2001); see also Rome Statute art. 22 ("The definition
of a crime shall be strictly construed and shall not be extended by analogy. In case of
ambiguity, the definition shall be interpreted in favour of the person being investigated,
prosecuted or convicted."). For an expression of concern about IHRL methodology's
penetration of ICL, see Darryl Robinson, The Identity Crisis of International Criminal Law,
21 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 925 (2008).
35 For a sympathetic view of this trend, see Beth Van Schaack, Crimen Sine Lege:
Judicial Lawmaking at the Intersection of Law and Morals, 97 GEO. L. J. 119, 191-92
(2008). For a less sympathetic view, see Robinson, supra note 34, at 958.
36 IMT Judgment, supra note 7, at 221.
37 Michael Akehurst, Jurisdiction in International Law, 46 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 145,
243 (1973).
38 The ICTY has indicated that in order to constitute an international crime, an IHL
violation that does not fall within the "grave breaches" (i.e., expressly ICL) provisions of
the Geneva Conventions "must constitute a breach of a rule protecting important values,"
"must involve grave consequences for the victim," and "must entail, under customary or
conventional law, the individual criminal responsibility of the person breaching the rule."
Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1-1, 94. The Tadid court's criteria, drawn from Nuremberg,
emphasized that "[s]tate practice indicating an intention to criminalize the prohibition,
including statements by government officials and international organizations, as well as
punishment of violations by national courts and military tribunals." Id. 1128.
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The Nuremberg judgment also contains the troublesome statement that
"the maxim nullum crimen sine lege is not a limitation of sovereignty, but is in
general a principle of justice. 39 Unmoored from its context, this language can
become transmogrified into a rationale to ignore nullum crimen whenever conduct
is asserted to be "malum in se," as opposed to merely "malum prohibitum," which
would imply nothing less than the principle's inapplicability to ICL. If ,nullum
crimen is principally a norm of fair notice, and if all human beings possessed of
reason are deemed to be "on notice" that malum in se acts authorized by their
states are inherently criminal, it might be said that no "principle of justice"
interferes with what are, in essence, prosecutions for natural-law crimes.4 °
The sleight-of-hand here is to confuse the impugned's act's moral gravity
with consensus among "the community of nations" as to its wrongfulness in all
circumstances. The principle's codification in current human rights law, Article
15 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, quite properly
allows that nullum crimen sine lege is not the same as nullum crimen sine lege
scripta; Article 15(2) permits prosecution of conduct that, "at the time when it was
committed, was criminal according to the general principles of law recognized by
the community of nations., 41  Thus, legal authority exists to establish the
criminality of universally reprehended conduct that, for whatever reason, was not
the subject of a positive legal prohibition formally applicable at the time and place
committed. But to be applicable, Article 15(2) requires a genuine, not an illusory,
consensus of the international community at the time of the act's commission.
Many acts that are condemned sweepingly in the abstract are subject to
justificatory defenses in some, but not other, legal orders that enjoy good standing
in the international community.
4 2
39 IMT Judgment, supra note 7, at 217.
40 For a domestic-law analogue to this mode of reasoning, see Dan M. Kahan,
Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 SuP. CT. REv. 345, 400-01 (1994)
("[W]hen the underlying conduct is located not on the border, but deep within the interior
of what is socially undesirable . . , a person who consciously seeks to come up to the
statutory 'line' without crossing it is not attempting to conform her behavior to the law, but
rather to evade punishment for admittedly wrongful or illegal acts.").
41 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 15, Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
42 I have addressed this issue at length in regard to the law of the former East
Germany. See Brad R. Roth, Retrospective Justice or Retroactive Standards? Human
Rights as a Sword in the East German Leaders Case, 50 WAYNE L. REv. 37 (2004). One
need look no farther than U.S. law. Although the United States is bound by Common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to refrain from cruel, humiliating, or degrading
treatment of detainees in non-international armed conflict, the 2006 amendment to the War
Crimes Acts abolished criminal liability for humiliating or degrading treatment and limited
criminal liability for cruel treatment to extreme instances, such as "bodily injury that
involves ... significant loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or
mental faculty." Military Commissions Act of 2006 § 6(b)(1)(B), Pub. L. No. 109-366,
120 Stat. 2600, 2634 (2006). The amendment further establishes that "[n]o foreign or
international source of law shall supply a basis for a rule of decision" in such a criminal
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The Third Reich, which committed multiple genocides and pan-
continental aggression, and sought to revise the entirety of the existing global
security order by force, was not worthy of such respect. Individuals participating
in its attack on the very foundations of the international legal order could not be
heard to interpose that order's norms as a defense. One can easily accommodate
the Nuremberg judgment without embracing natural justice as a basis for criminal
prosecution (ironically, a principle that, in a perverse form, marked Nazi law).43
If Nuremberg language can be taken out of context to weaken constraints
on international prosecutions, language in the Israeli High Court's Eichmann
judgment can be so invoked without such distortion. Seeking to justify its result
by every possible rationale, the court went so far as to deny altogether that nullum
crimen sine lege was a principle of international law. 44 It is hardly clear that such
a repudiation was necessary to the outcome of that case. Even if some maneuver
was required, the combination of the underdevelopment of pre-World War II
international penal norms and the extraordinary circumstances of Nazi atrocities -
repudiation of which underlay the post-World War I re-creation of the
international legal order - could easily have grounded a narrow exception rather
than the trashing of the very "principle of legality." The lesson seems clear: hard
cases do not necessarily make bad law, but extreme cases can generate bad dicta.
By contrast, the Special Court for Sierra Leone case of Sam Hinga
Norman understood that it had to determine whether, in regard to the international
norm prohibiting enlistment of children in armed forces, "by 1996 it was intended
by the international community to be a criminal law prohibition for the breach of
which individuals should be arrested and punished., 45 In a 2-1 decision, the panel
majority found adequate "[s]tate practice indicating an intention to criminalize the
prohibition. 46 Judge Geoffrey Robertson, finding otherwise, elaborated in his
dissenting opinion the standard that must be met to elevate the human rights
standard to an international penal standard:
There must be evidence (or at least inference) of general
agreement by the international community that breach of the
matter. Id. § 6(a)(2); see also Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding that
U.S. officials entitled to civil immunity for Constitutional claims where the alleged acts of
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment occurred outside what had at that time been "clearly
established" to count as U.S. territory); Rasul v. Myers, 512 F.3d 644 (D.C. Cir. 2008),
vacated, 555 U.S. 1083 (2008), reinstated in relevant part, 563 F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
43 See INGO MOLLER, HITLER'S JUSTICE: THE COURTS OF THE THIRD REICH 68-81
(1991).
44 Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. at 282 ("[I]f it is the contention of counsel for the appellant
that we must apply international law as it is, and not as it ought to be from a moral point of
view, then we must reply precisely from a legal point of view, no such rule of international
law is to be found." (alteration in original)).
45 Prosecutor v. Sam Hinga Norman, Case No. SCSL-2004-14-AR72(E), Decision
on Preliminary Motion Based on Lack of Jurisdiction (Child Recruitment), T 20 (Special
Ct. for Sierra Leone May 31, 2004) (Robertson, J., dissenting).
46 Id. 37 (majority opinion).
70 Arizona Journal of International & Comparative Law Vol. 31, No. 1 2014
customary law rule would or would now [1996], entail
international criminal liability for individual perpetrators, in
addition to the normative obligation on States to prohibit the
conduct in question under their domestic law .... [I]t must be
clear that the overwhelming preponderance of states, courts,
conventions, jurists and so forth relied upon to crystallize the
international law "norm" intended - or now [1996] intend - this
rule to have penal consequences for individuals brought before
international courts, whether or not such a court presently exists
with jurisdiction over them. 47
Judge Robertson, a well-known ICL expert, characterized the stakes as follows:
Here, the Prosecution asserts with some insouciance that "the
principle of nullem crimen sine lege is not in any case applied
rigidly, particularly where the acts in question are universally
regarded as abhorrent and deeply shock the conscience of
humanity." On the contrary, it is precisely when the acts are
abhorrent and deeply shocking that the principle of legality must
be most stringently applied, to ensure that a defendant is not
convicted out of disgust rather than evidence, or of a non-
existent crime. Nullem crimen may not be a household phrase,
but it serves as some protection against the lynch mob.48
As nullum crimen sine lege is, indeed, an ICL principle, it must be
overcome by the demonstrable emergence of an international norm that
establishes individual penal responsibility. Where a domestic court prosecutes
conduct perpetrated outside its territory by a foreign national in the absence of a
traditionally recognized domestic interest (e.g., territorial effects of conduct
committed abroad or, at least in some circumstances, protection of nationals
abroad), the court must find that international lawmaking processes have
expressly or tacitly conferred universal legislative and adjudicative jurisdiction
over the personal conduct in question.49
47 Id. 17, 21 (Robertson, J., dissenting).
48 Id. 12 (citing Prosecution Response, 17) (emphasis added).
49 The Lotus affirmation that "restrictions on the independence of states cannot be
presumed" is sometimes interpreted to mean that states may presumptively exercise
jurisdiction to prescribe however they choose, subject to a specific showing of state
practice and opinio juris that demonstrates a restrictive norm. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.),
1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 7). A close reading of Lotus indicates that the
court "majority" (really, six out of twelve judges, with the President voting a second time to
break the tie) said no such thing. The Lotus decision began by asserting a presumptive
universal jurisdiction to adjudicate civil cases with respect to persons found in the territory,
on what we would now call a "transitory tort" logic. Then, the court considered whether
the presumption of universal jurisdiction that it found in civil cases applied also to criminal
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This establishment of universal jurisdiction is now additionally taken (at
least in criminal cases) to overcome the functional immunity that otherwise
applies to state agents' conduct inside their national territory and within the scope
of their official capacity. Thus, in the Pinochet case, the British House of Lords
ultimately determined that while torture had long been prohibited by a human
rights norm rising to the level ofjus cogens ("accepted and recognized by the
international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation
is permitted"),5 ° it was only the coming into force of the Torture Convention in
1987 that, solely on a prospective basis, established the international crime and
licensed the trumping of immunity. 51 As the lead opinion of Lord Browne-
Wilkinson stated:
I have doubts whether, before the coming into force of the
Torture Convention, the existence of the international crime of
torture as jus cogens was enough to justify the conclusion that
the organisation of state torture could not rank for immunity
purposes as an official function. At that stage there was no
international tribunal to punish torture and no general
jurisdiction to permit or require its punishment in domestic
courts. Not until there was some form of universal jurisdiction
for the punishment of the crime of torture could it really be
talked about as a fully constituted international crime. But in
my judgment the Torture Convention did provide what was
missing: a worldwide universal jurisdiction. 52
cases-that is to say, whether there is also a presumptive extraterritorial jurisdiction to
prescribe. On this, the court "majority" decided not to decide (dissenting opinions are clear
in the negative), on the ground that the facts of this case did not require examination of a
ground of extraterritorial jurisdiction that had been neither clearly licensed nor clearly
disallowed. Although state practice and opinio juris were equivocal on the validity of the
principle permitting domestic prosecution of extraterritorial conduct based solely on the
nationality of the victims, they were unequivocal in permitting prosecutions based on
territorial effects.
In any event, even if a presumptive universality of legislative jurisdiction were
plausible in 1927, authorities are fairly clear that it is not plausible now. See Arrest
Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Beig.), 2002 I.C.J. 1, 14-15 (Feb. 14)
(separate opinion of Judge Guillaume); see also CHRISTIAN TOMUSCHAT & JEAN-MARC
THOUVENIN, THE FUNDAMENTAL RULES OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER: JUS COGENS
AND OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES 439 (Christian Tomuschat & Jean-Marc Thouvenin eds.,
2006) (stating to the extent that it was ever valid, this "doctrine has fallen into obsolescence
as a consequence of the development of the doctrine of jurisdiction according to which any
State activity lure imperii requires a reasonable link").
50 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331(entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
51 See generally Pinochet.
52 Pinochet, [2000] 1 A.C. at 204-05 (opinion of Lord Browne-Wilkinson)
(emphasis added). Somewhat surprisingly, the House of Lords went on a few years later to
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Notwithstanding this holding, it is commonplace forjus cogens alone to
be cited as a basis for nullifying immunity. The argument typically given is that
because immunity (including both the immunity ratione personae of sitting heads
of state, heads of government, foreign ministers, and accredited diplomats and the
immunity ratione materiae of anyone executing official acts within national
territory) is an ordinary norm of the international order, it must give way to a
peremptory norm as a matter of "normative hierarchy. ' 53
Putting aside the question of the methodological basis for determining
what counts as a peremptory norm - identified authoritatively with recognition as
such "by the international community of States as a whole, 54 but associated in
much of the literature with natural justice - jus cogens does not operate in this
way.55 An obligation to prosecute ajus cogens violation, where it exists at all, is
hold unanimously that current and former state officials retained their immunity ratione
materiae in civil suits based on their internationally criminal conduct. Jones v. Ministry of
the Interior of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 2006 U.K.H.L. 26. For a persuasive criticism
of this holding, see E. Steinerte & R.M.M. Wallace, Case Report: Jones v. Ministry of the
Interior of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 901, 905 (2006).
53 See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Laurence R. Helfer, International Law and the
US. Common Law of Foreign Official Immunity, 2010 SuP. CT. REv. 213, 236-37 (2010).
But see John Bellinger, Why the Solicitor General Should Ask the Supreme Court to
Reverse the Fourth Circuit's Decision in Samantar, LAWFARE BLOG (July 16, 2013),
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/07/why-the-solicitor-general-should-ask-the-supreme-
court-to-reverse-the-fourth-circuits-decision-in-samantar/ (contending that such an override
of immunity reflects an erroneous understanding of international law).
"4 See Vienna Convention, supra note 50, art. 53 (defining jus cogens, or
"peremptory" norms).
55 As the International Court of Justice has recently noted:
[T]his argument about the effect ofjus cogens displacing the law of
State immunity has been rejected by the national courts of the United
Kingdom (Jones v. Saudi Arabia, House of Lords, [2007] 1 AC 270;
ILR, Vol. 129, p. 629), Canada (Bouzari v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
Court of Appeal of Ontario, DLR, 4th Series, Vol. 243, p. 406; ILR,
Vol. 128, p. 586), Poland (Natoniewski, Supreme Court, Polish
Yearbook of International Law, Vol. XXX, 2010, p. 299), Slovenia
(case No. Up-13/99, Constitutional Court of Slovenia), New Zealand
(Fang v. Jiang, High Court, [2007] NZAR p. 420; ILR, Vol. 141, p.
702), and Greece (Margellos, Special Supreme Court, ILR, Vol. 129, p.
525), as well as by the European Court of Human Rights in Al-Adsani v.
United Kingdom and Kalogeropoulou and others v. Greece and
Germany .... in each case after careful consideration.
Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 99, 96 (Feb. 3)
(alteration in original).
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not ipso facto a jus cogens obligation, and so does not override norms that limit
prosecutorial authority.
56
The failure of thejus cogens trump is seen most clearly in regard to the
immunity ratione personae - a defense to jurisdiction over the person - that
attaches to current holders of specific positions relevant to international
diplomacy. Immunity ratione personae is a purely procedural defense, with no
substantive implications: the immunity temporarily blocks the exercise of
jurisdiction over the person, but it has no bearing on the criminality of the
underlying conduct. As soon as the immunity is withdrawn, either because the
person ceases to hold the immune post or because his or her state waives the
immunity, all special defenses to liability are removed. But for as long as the
immunity remains in place, it operates rigidly. Courts time and again have held
that whereas international tribunals may be created under statutes that expressly
override personal immunities, domestic courts have no license, from jus cogens or
elsewhere, to disregard personal immunities (which, however, persist only as long
as the person holds the immune post).
5 7
The jus cogens trump equally fails in regard to immunity ratione
materiae - a defense to jurisdiction, both legislative and adjudicative, over the
subject matter - that otherwise attaches to official conduct. This failure is
masked, however, by the fact that many jus cogens violations have also become
established as international crimes. Absent that development, though, and with
respect to any conduct prior thereto, immunity ratione materiae remains effective,
shielding even jus cogens-violating state agents from a foreign state's
extraterritorial legislation that would purport to reach official conduct.58
56 See, e.g., WARD N. FERDINANDUSSE, DIRECT APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW IN NATIONAL COURTS 182 (2006).
57 See, e.g., Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. BeIg.), 2002
I.C.J. Rep. 3 (Feb. 14). See generally Sean D. Murphy, Immunity Ratione Personae of
Foreign Government Officials and Other Topics: The Sixty-Fifth Session of the
International Law Commission, 108 AM. J. INT'L L (forthcoming 2014), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2350495 (citing cases at 9 nn.31-36).
Immunity ratione materiae, albeit a procedural defense, has substantive
implications that are sometimes missed. Since it is a defense to legislative jurisdiction,
another state's extraterritorial jurisdiction over any conduct other than a universal-
jurisdiction crime is blocked, meaning that the act - even if validly reached by foreign
legislation on territorial effects, protective, or passive personality grounds, and even if ajus
cogens violation - does not count as criminal for the state agent at the time and place
committed. This framework has an important implication for retroactive waiver. Foreign
state officials are often being hung out to dry by successor governments, and generally
speaking, immunities - existing for the sake of state rather than individual interest - are
waivable. States can clearly waive their former officials' defenses to adjudicative
jurisdiction over past acts, but while states can waive immunity to legislative jurisdiction as
well, what they cannot do is to waive retroactively the effects of a previously existing
barrier to a foreign state's extraterritorial legislative jurisdiction. If the act was not a
criminal act for the state official at the time and place that he committed it, it cannot
become a criminal act retroactively as a result of a subsequent waiver.
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Jurisdictional limitations, immunities, and nullum crimen sine lege
combine to constrain what domestic courts can do in the name of redressing IHRL
and IHL violations abroad. The limitations can be significant, as in the case of the
Torture Convention's distinction between torture, which is established as a
universal-jurisdiction crime, and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment short of
torture, which is not.59 Yet natural justice itself, properly understood, demands
that penal standards be rooted in discernment of social fact rather than in bare
assertion of moral truth. The international community has come so far, and no
farther, in licensing transnational prosecutions. Excesses of rhetorical exuberance,
if ever implemented, would actually undermine the normative foundations of
international criminal justice.
IV. "RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT" AND
THE LIMITS OF ADMISSIBLE INTERVENTION
Even the most scrupulous observance of legal limitations on the scope of
extraterritorial prosecutions leaves much low-hanging fruit. Violent political
conflict (whether or not rising to the threshold for the applicability of the law of
armed conflict) is everywhere associated with conduct that plausibly breaches
international penal norms. With the increased prospect of domestic court
invocations of universal jurisdiction, there is a dispersal of prosecutorial discretion
to as many as one hundred ninety-odd justice systems. Whereas the ICC is
designed with checks to maximize the likelihood of a judicious use of this
discretion, 60 there is nothing to prevent naked political agendas from dominating
the exercise of this authority in domestic systems. Rather than selecting plausible
candidates for "the worst of the worst," extraterritorial prosecutions in domestic
courts will predictably be brought against targets of opportunity, selected for
reasons ranging from benign to random to blatantly partisan.
There are, of course, powerful practical disincentives for domestic legal
systems to get into this game. States generally do not wish to get embroiled in the
diplomatic controversies that such cases engender, nor to incur retaliatory
prosecutions of their own officials in the domestic systems of aggrieved states.
One of the most active early sites of universal jurisdiction prosecutions, the
Belgian system, revised its universal jurisdiction statute in an effort to constrict its
openness to ideologically motivated applications (which had included criminal
59 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment
or Punishment art. 16, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Torture Convention];
see also Brad R. Roth, Just Short of Torture: Abusive Treatment and the Limits of
International Criminal Justice, 6 J. INT'L CRIM. JUsTICE 215 (2008).
60 See Rome Statute arts. 61 (charges must be confirmed by a Pre-Trial Chamber
composed of judges elected by the Assembly of States Parties), 17 (charges cannot be
brought unless the Court finds the state in question to be "unwilling or unable genuinely to
carry out the investigation or prosecution").
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complaints against both Ariel Sharon and Yasir Arafat). 61 A nightmare scenario
of 190 justice systems targeting current and former officials of disfavored states is
a long way off.
In principle, states have not only a license, but an obligation, to exercise
universal jurisdiction against alleged perpetrators of international crimes found in
62their territories. In practice, "prosecute or extradite" obligations lie dormant in
the absence of a live request for extradition, something that, in the universal
jurisdiction context, comes along quite rarely (e.g., in the Pinochet and Habr
cases).
Nonetheless, the loaded weapon lies on the table. 63 The question is
whether one should be urging more widespread use or whether the prevailing
reluctance should be seen as salutary. One danger is that in all, but the most
morally and politically unambiguous cases, outcomes on the merits would tend to
depend on the political predilections prevalent in the forum state, thereby breeding
cynicism about "universal" justice. 64 Another danger is that considerations of
international legality will be manipulatively enlisted, not on the side of interstate
peace, but on the side of agitation for aggressive unilateral action against
wrongdoing regimes.65
Contrary to what is frequently imagined, the international order's non-
intervention norms were designed to withstand wrongdoing on the part of those
norms' beneficiaries. 66 There is no innovation in the claim that sovereignty entails
responsibility for the protection of states' territorial populations; this
responsibility is implicit in the UN Charter and explicit in human rights treaties
and declarations. 67  But the inviolability of territorial sovereignty, vis-6-vis
61 Steiner, supra note 10, at 225-26. At the time of this writing, Spain is
considering a similar curtailment of its courts' authority to exercise universal jurisdiction.
See Jim Yardley, Spain Seeks to Curb Law Allowing Judges to Pursue Cases Globally,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2014, at A7.
62 See Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belg. v. Sen.),
2012 I.C.J., Judgment (July 20).
63 The allusion here is to Justice Jackson's rhetoric in Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214, 244 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
64 See Steiner, supra note 10, at 230 ("Far from representing a common effort of
judiciaries everywhere to vindicate common goals, universal jurisdiction could be
understood as a partisan enterprise in which states seeing the villain would reach out to
prosecute, while those holding the image of hero would not.").
65 The U.S. indictment, prior to the 1989 invasion of Panama, of Panamanian army
chief Manuel Noriega - albeit for drug trafficking rather than human rights-related offenses
- illustrates the political utility of this means of vilification. See, e.g., Jeff Cohen & Mark
Cook, How Television Sold the Panama Invasion, FAIRNESS & AccuRAcY IN REPORTING
(Jan. 1, 1990), http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=1546.
66 See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nic. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 134-
35, 267-68 (June 27).
67 See, e.g., U.N. Charter preamble, arts. 1(2)-(3), 55-56; International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (1966) (ICCPR), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23,
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individual foreign states or ad hoc groups of states, is nowhere made contingent
on those foreign states' judgments about the target state's compliance.
International law permits the use against wrongdoers of the unilateral political and
economic measures that fall within states' discretion (as a matter of their external
sovereignty) and also may permit recourse to non-forcible, but presumptively
unlawful measures ("countermeasures") that are necessary and proportionate to
the task of impelling the target state's compliance.68 But forcible recourse is
neither explicitly nor implicitly licensed by human rights and humanitarian law
instruments or by customary international law. Clearly, this leaves a gap, as the
legally permissible responses of individual states and coalitions may be
inadequate to secure compliance with norms of imperative significance.
In such cases, it is only the Security Council, in the exercise of its
Chapter VII powers, that has the capacity to override the legal limitations on the
coercion of wrongdoing states. Contrary to the popular misconception, however,
the Security Council is not a law enforcement body. It is charged with making
political judgments about threats to the peace, whether in the presence or absence
of a violation of international law, and it authorizes measures at its discretion,
irrespective of and overriding existing international legal obligations.69  The
Security Council is best understood not as an executive branch of global
government that faithfully executes the law, but as the guardian of a suspension
clause - not unlike the notorious "state of exception" provision contained in
Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution70 - that authorizes such supra-legal
measures as the Council deems necessary and appropriate.
This is a system designed for a moderately distrustful international
system in which weak states that lack all capacity for self-help need to be
reassured against powerful states' abuses of self-help--past instances of which
representatives of weak states can copiously cite. The system is thus designed to
guard against a suspension of non-intervention norms in all cases where the
broadest international consensus - cutting across differences of geostrategic
interest, ideology, and culture - cannot be secured. A propensity to deadlock is
built into the system by design, 7' and while deadlock may in some circumstances
1976); International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (1966) (ICESCR),
999 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976).
68 See Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 53d sess, Apr. 23-June 1, July 2-Aug. 10,
2001, art. 49, U.N. Doc. A/56/10; GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001) ("An injured
State may only take countermeasures . . . in order to induce [the wrongdoing] State to
comply with its obligations .... "); id. art. 51 ("Countermeasures must be commensurate
with the injury suffered .... ); id. art. 54 (allowing for responses by "[a]ny State other than
an injured State" to breaches of those obligations recognized in Article 48 as being "owed
to the international community as a whole," but mentioning only "lawful measures," rather
than countermeasures).
69 U.N. Charter arts. 39, 41-42, 103.
70 See, e.g., GEORGE SCHWAB, THE CHALLENGE OF THE EXCEPTION 29-60 (1989).
71 For a historical examination of the Security Council's structure and functioning,
see Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., The Security Council's First Fifty Years, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 506
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expose flaws, deadlock itself is not evidence of flawed design, unless one wishes
to dismiss (as do many commentators-typically from the strongest states) the
system's foundational considerations.
The Security Council's extraordinary powers currently extend to
circumstances where "national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity. 72  Armed humanitarian intervention thus has both substantive and
procedural requisites. However, the substantive requisite - tied to ICL standards -
is essentially indeterminate, since a country beset by civil war is almost invariably
one in which "national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their
populations from . . . war crimes. 73 The result is that the procedural requisite -
nine affirmative votes out of fifteen Security Council members and no veto from
any of the Permanent Five (P5) - is the only true barrier to intervention. The
combination of a too-weak substantive constraint and a potentially too-strong
procedural constraint creates the perfect condition for discontent, as the currently
accepted "R2P" formula promises action that it is institutionally incapable of
delivering. This leads potentially to a fork in the road: a retreat into cynicism, or
an alliance with powerful but untrusted unilateralists.
Those who favor licensing unilateral humanitarian intervention invoke
the Rwanda example continuously.74 Yet on close examination, the logic of that
invocation is elusive. The underlying notion, of course, is that Rwanda evidences
the need for more of the right interventions in the right places. This notion is
unexceptionable (even if there is some reason to be relatively pessimistic about
the humanitarian prospects of even "good" interventions). But international law is
incapable of calling forth such beneficence on the part of those who have the
capacity to do good; its only real role is either to constrain or to license such
behavior as powerful states are disposed to engage in.
When one looks at Rwanda and asks what powerful states were disposed
to do, there turn out to have been two answers: (1) nothing (e.g., the United
States) and (2) worse than nothing (i.e., France). Legal regard for Rwandan
sovereignty played no role whatsoever in obstructing the rescue of Tutsis from the
Hutu extremists; there was nothing to obstruct because no one was willing to
invest blood and treasure in that project.75 France was later willing to invest blood
(1995). The veto was established as a substitute for the more debilitating "safeguard" of
Council unanimity contained in the League of Nations Covenant. Id. at 506-07.
72 2005 World Summit Outcome, supra note 3, 139; see also S.C. Res. 1674,
supra note 3, 4 (reaffirming paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit
Outcome, supra note 3).
73 2005 World Summit Outcome, supra note 3, 139.
74 See, e.g., SAMANTHA POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HELL: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF
GENOCIDE (2002); Int'l Comm'n on Intervention & State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to
Protect (2001), http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf.
75 See, e.g., Michael N. Barnett, The UN Security Council, Indifference, and
Genocide in Rwanda, 12 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 551, 560 (1997) ("[T]here were no
volunteers for such a force.").
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and treasure in protecting Hutus (their former clients) from revenge killings by the
insurgent Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front - a motive that may not have been
malign (the evidence is mixed)76 - but the effect of this was to preserve the Hutu
extremist militias and to metastasize the conflict.
7 7
So, indeed, the Rwandan experience says something damning about the
international community, but sovereignty considerations actually played no role in
the debacle. The argument for a more broadly permissive norm, then, actually
proceeds not from the Rwandan example itself, but from a confabulated "Rwanda
Prime" example in which a ready, willing, and able intervener was blocked by,
say, the Russians and Chinese (who, in the actual event, did not block anything).
Viewed this way, the argument looks far less compelling.
Legal rules are crafted to constrain untrusted and untrustworthy
implementers of universal principles. Potential intervening powers need to be
viewed, not as a humanitarian "we," but as a "they" who occasionally act in the
name of humanitarianism. The "they" may not always look like Dick Cheney, but
one needs to craft legal norms based, among other things, on a sober calculation of
the odds that interveners will look like Dick Cheney and based on the
understanding that many of the participants in the scheme of cooperation expect
would-be interveners to look like Dick Cheney. The international order requires,
not only substantive norms, but procedural norms for adjudicating disagreements
as to the substance, and these procedural norms need to be agreeable to the (at
least moderately) distrustful.
Moreover, intervention is usually not about stopping wars, but about
participating in them; where (as in Syria) adverse powers are willing to supply the
opposing side, intervening may simply further escalate the conflict. Part of the
justification of the requirement of a Security Council P5 consensus is that any
conflict that has P5 powers on opposite sides is going to be far worse.
This is not to say that the rules of the international system are perfect as
they are, nor that they should command unconditional fidelity. Pitted against the
moral obligation to comply with centrally important international legal norms, a
substantive judgment of moral emergency may nonetheless occasionally prevail.
The veto is best justified as an exercise of genuine, albeit minoritarian, judgment
and as a guarantee that extraordinary measures are backed by a cross-cutting
consensus. The mere fact of a veto, no matter how substantively arbitrary and no
76 According to one source, "General Jean-Claude Lafourcade, commander of
Operation Turquoise, admitted that the safe zone was intended to keep alive the Hutu
government in the hope that it would deny the RPF total victory and international
recognition as the rulers of Rwanda." Chris McGreal, France's Shame?, THE GUARDIAN
(Jan. 11, 2007), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/jan/1 1/rwanda.insideafrica.
Whether this is true, the French intervention had the effect of facilitating the passage of
genocidal Hutu militias into neighboring Congo, where their presence precipitated a series
of devastating armed conflicts.
77 For a critical account of the intervention's effects on the ground, see PHILIP
GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT TOMORROW WE WILL BE KILLED WITH OUR
FAMILIES: STORIES FROM RWANDA 157-61 (1998).
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matter how isolated the vetoing state is in its obstructionism, is not a persuasive
reason to condemn unapproved action, the human benefits of which manifestly
figure massively to outweigh the human costs. In such cases, the harm of such an
unapproved action might be mitigated by an accompanying proposal of a narrowly
specified exception to the procedural requisite, perhaps under the rubric of
"forcible countermeasures." (It is interesting that the NATO powers were quite
deliberately unwilling to craft such a legal rationale in connection with the
Kosovo action-some out of concern to avert proliferation of such actions, 78 some
evidently out of concern to keep a free hand.) But if the precedent of
unauthorized intervention comes to stand for the principle that established
procedures should be ignored whenever they fail to yield the "right" decision, the
result will be to undermine the foundations of international peace and security.
In sum, the existing procedural norms governing forcible intervention are
considerably better than their reputation. They fairly well fit the world in which
we actually live, even if they would be dysfunctional in the world in which we
wish we could live.
V. CONCLUSION
The post-Cold War revival of international criminal justice has important
successes to its credit. Foremost among these, perhaps, has been to make "ethnic
cleansing" a term of global opprobrium. International criminal justice draws the
line between the sad realities of endemic conflict and the handiwork of enemies of
humanity, identifying what can be perceived across geostrategic, ideological, and
cultural divides as abjectly criminal rather than as cognizably political. But it can
do so fairly and persuasively only when it does so modestly. And because it
identifies those whom international law casts beyond the realm of peaceful
coexistence, it is inevitably in tension with legal constraints on the righteous
pursuit of self-help.
Although hard cases do not necessarily make bad law, extreme cases
generate bad dicta. The rhetoric of international criminal law tends to be
addressed to morally unambiguous conflicts, where one side used atrocious means
in the service of a manifestly evil end. Yet political violence is a far more
complex phenomenon than such rhetoric suggests and calls for a broad range of
nuanced responses. As slogans such as "an end to impunity" and "no safe
havens" become prevalent in the rhetoric of international law advocates,
accommodation and restraint become cast as vices rather than virtues, to the
detriment of the international legal order's most practicable mission: peaceful
cooperation among actors who cannot be expected to agree about justice.
Paradoxically, instead of contributing to its presumed mission of furthering
78 See Thomas M. Franck, Lessons of Kosovo, 93 AM J. INT'L L. 857, 859 (1999);
Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN, and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EURo. J. INT'L L. 1,
14 (1999).
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accountability in the exercise of power, international criminal law may end up
furnishing a rationale to disparage and to flout norms designed to hold powerful
states accountable.
An insistence on the thoroughgoing eradication of impunity presupposes
victors and vanquished and is inconsistent with peace in the world that we know.
Wisdom lies in the recognition that constraint on the righteous exercise of power,
far from frustrating legality's ends, is often law's highest and best use.
